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AbstrAct: According to Umberto Eco, «every story tells a story that has already 
been told» (Eco, 1985: 19). In this context, The Financial Expert, a novel written 
by R. K. Narayan in 1952 shares interesting analogies with significant events and 
persons in the postmodern world of finance during the last twenty years or so. 
Narayan’s understanding of the world of finance echoes recent phenomena like 
the bankruptcy of the Lehman Brothers on 15 September 2008, the Ponzi scheme 
of Bernard Madoff, a swindler during the 1990s, the Sub-prime Mortgage Crisis, 
etc. This paper traces analogies among them and thus opens up a fascinating 
world of intersections and cross-references. In this intricate world, the present 
and the past, the real and the fictional, the existing and the evolving – all 
interact with each other; and the pathways thus created invite our attention to the 
recurring economic phenomenon of bubble formation and its eventual burst. This 
paper rests on the premise that the exploration of the deeply-rooted analogical 
relationship between various texts can make the understanding of the world of 
finance more comprehensible.
Keywords: intertext, bubble, shadow banking, Ponzi scheme, moral hazard, 
securitization, greed.
resumen: Según Umberto Eco (1985: 19), «todas las historias cuentan una 
historia que ya ha sido contada». The Financial Expert, escrita en 1952 por 
R. K. Narayan, presenta interesantes analogías con acontecimientos y personas 
significativas en el mundo financiero posmoderno de los últimos veinte años. El 
conocimiento del mundo financiero por parte de Narayan resuena con los recien-
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tes fenómenos de la bancarrota de Lehman Brothers el 15 de septiembre de 2008, 
el esquema Ponzi del estafador durante los años 1990, Bernard Madoff, la crisis 
de las hipotecas basura, etc. Este artículo explora las analogías entre tales hechos 
para descubrir un fascinante mundo de intersecciones y referencias cruzadas. En 
ese complejo mundo, el presente y el pasado, lo real y lo ficticio, lo existente y lo 
emergente, interactúan, invitándonos a reflexionar sobre el fenómeno recurrente 
de la formación y estallido de las burbujas financieras. El análisis de la profunda 
relación entre textos diferentes puede ayudar en la comprensión del mundo finan-
ciero.
Palabras clave: intertexto, burbuja financiera, banca en la sombra, esquema Ponzi, 
riesgo moral, titulización, avaricia.
The act of reading, theorists claim, plunges 
us into a network of textual relations. To interpret a text, 
to discover its meaning, or meanings, is to trace those 
relations. Reading thus becomes a process of moving 
between texts. Meaning becomes something which exists 
between a text and all other texts to which it refers and 
relates, moving out from the independent text 
into a network of textual relations. The text becomes 
the intertext. (Allen, 2007: 1)
This paper focuses on the complex mechanism the banking business 
usually thrives on by analyzing R. K. Narayan’s novel The Financial Expert 
(1952) as an intertext in dialogue with certain real-life phenomena and crises, 
like Bernard Madoff’s Ponzi scheme, the Sub-prime Mortgage crisis, the 
bankruptcy of global banks like the Lehman Brothers, and the global economic 
crisis. It rests on the premise that textual rendition of these real-life events in 
media and popular imagination reads dialogically with Narayan’s novel, and 
opens up an interesting discourse on the business of banking that is prone to 
go awry any time owing to human greed for wealth. The bankruptcy of the 
Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc., the insolvency of Margayya, the protagonist 
in the novel, and the Ponzi scheme of Bernard Madoff read like curious case 
histories and lay bare the sensational nature of the banking business when 
it becomes adventurous. How these micro-failures pave the way for macro-
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failures in the form of massive crises like the recent ones can be understood 
more clearly by having a look at the way certain individuals and institutions 
become adventurous beyond their capacities and wreak havoc for millions in 
the wake of their downfall.
The Financial Expert, written in 1952 by R. K. Narayan, narrates the 
financial career of Margayya, a money-minded middle-aged private banker 
in Malgudi during the 1940s. Written at the time when most countries in the 
postwar period adopted Keynes’ ideas on economic policy, the novel presents 
a fictional account of money lending and private banking in India at that time. 
The decade of the 1940s in India was one of the most tumultuous times in her 
history: fighting its last battle to get freedom from the British, India was an 
unwilling participant in World War II; its economy was largely market-driven 
in spite of the late realization by her British masters of the need for state 
intervention. Actually, the British policy of economic liberalism and a self-
regulating market had left people especially from the rural areas at the mercy of 
mahajans (traditional moneylenders in India). These moneylenders were free 
to charge exorbitant rates of interest to their clients in the form of cash or kind. 
It gradually resulted in widespread rural indebtedness and land alienation. The 
late interference of the colonial masters with the financial market in the form 
of the Co-operative Movement to contain rural poverty and indebtedness lies 
in the background of the novel. William Walsh (1983: 72) rightly avers that 
The Financial Expert is «an exact account of village usury and city deceit and 
a controlled probing into the motives of money-making».
Margayya, a reputed financer of Malgudi passes through many stages of 
mercurial rise in his financial career before he eventually meets his furious 
fall owing chiefly to his penchant for adventurous banking. The novelist 
divides the tale of his financial wizardry into three distinct phases which can 
be equated with Paul Krugman’s analysis of the history of banking business in 
the us. Krugman divides the financial history of the us into the following three 
eras: (i) before 1930 when banking was an exciting industry featuring a number 
of larger-than-life figures who built giant financial empires, some of which 
were based on fraud; (ii) the post-Depression phase between 1930 and 1980 
when banking became boring due to tight state regulations; and (iii) the post-
1980 phase when banking became exciting again after most of the regulations 
were lifted and finance again became a high-paying career (Krugman, 2009 b). 
This description of the national history of banking business in the us finds its 
interesting parallel in the personal history of Margayya in the novel as far as 
the level of adventure involved is concerned: the first phase depicts Margayya 
as a commission agent sitting under a banyan tree before the Central Co-
 46 clr ˙ doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.6035/clr.2014.12.3 ˙ issn 1697-7750 · vol. xii \ 2014, pp. 43-57
operative Land Mortgage Bank in Malgudi, and managing the nitty-gritty of 
land mortgages for the illiterate peasant-clients of the bank. This business is 
quite close to his heart as it is full of adventure. He remains at the centre of 
all the complex transactions of the bank by clearing up the «red-tape» hurdles 
from the path of customers seeking loans from the bank (Narayan, 2007: 3). 
His clients hail him as «a wizard» who employs his «contrivance» to enable 
them «to draw unlimited loans from the Co-operative Bank» (Narayan, 2007: 
2). This adventurous phase in Margayya’s financial career comes to an abrupt 
end when the Secretary dismisses him from the courtyard of the Bank and the 
same day his only son Balu tears off his accounts book at home and throws 
it in the gutter. After a forty-day propitiation of Lakshmi, the Hindu goddess 
of wealth, Margayya begins a career as printer and becomes very rich and 
reputed very soon. However, he finds this printing business too «boring» and 
«alien» for a «genius» like him (Narayan, 2007: 117). He actually craves for 
«an adult business» with «sufficient adventure in it» (Narayan, 2007: 118). He 
subsequently sells his share in the printing business to his partner in order to 
become a banker in his own right. This brings the second phase of his career 
to a close. In the third and final phase, he becomes a banker, acquires an office 
in the Market Road, the busiest street in Malgudi, and starts dealing in the 
mysteries of money. The whole day now he has «to talk, counsel, wheedle out, 
and collect money; in fact go through all the adventures of money-making» 
(Narayan, 2007: 148). That leaves him extremely tired at the end of the day. 
Still he enjoys his banking business too much. Very soon he «earns» his place 
«among the elect in society»: people flock to him «for guidance, advice and 
management» (Narayan, 2007: 124). His reputation as a «Wizard» (this time 
with capital ‘W’) among his clients returns. His clients now include the «well-
to-do people» as well as «smaller tradesmen and clerks and workers» of the 
region (Narayan, 2007: 200). Whatever he now says sounds «authoritative 
and mature»; people listen to him «with respectful attention» (Narayan, 
2007: 149). This enviable description of Margayya sitting in his office with 
his clients surrounding him resonates well with the manner global experts in 
wealth management appear regularly in the media nowadays to guide people 
in money matters. Certain institutions even think of conferring on him «a title» 
for «doing the greatest public service» by making people «happy and secure» 
through his «help»; the narrator reports that even the Government thinks of 
giving him «at least a Public Service Medal» for his social services (Narayan, 
2007: 200). But one day Margayya’s financial house of cards crumbles down 
to dust within moments when Dr. Pal, his most trusted agent, begins spreading 
rumour about the former’s mental health. As the rumour spreads in the market 
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like a wild fire, people begin to throng Margayya’s house demanding their 
deposits back there and then. By afternoon that day «all the cash in the house 
was gone» and still there «seemed to be only one theme for all the cries: “My 
money! My money gone! All my savings gone!”» (Narayan, 2007: 215-16). 
Ultimately, Margayya has to file for insolvency to save himself and his family 
from the fury of his clients.
When Graham Greene (1966: viii) describes the novel as a satire on 
«modern desire for wealth», he brings under scrutiny the human weakness for 
money much aggravated by laissez faire policy and capitalist economy. The 
novel reads like an intertext inspiring a series of analogies among various texts 
which resonate and reverberate in one another. The events and institutions 
of particular interest in the present context are the Ponzi scheme of Bernard 
Madoff during the 1990s and the bankruptcy of the Lehman Brothers driven by 
the sub-prime crisis in 2008. Interestingly, Madoff and the Lehman are also the 
sweet but poisonous fruits of adventurous banking, as Margayya is in the novel. 
The Lehman Brothers, for instance, began as a modest dry-goods store in 1850 
and gradually expanded its business in diverse areas before setting its eyes on 
the business of asset-management during 1990s. The coming times witnessed a 
dazzling expansion in its assets and workforce. During these times, it emerged 
as an iconic figure for bankers. Before going bankrupt on 15 September 2008, 
it had amassed assets worth more than $275 billion under its management. This 
amount was remarkable in the sense that it was 600% more than its assets just 
fourteen years before in 1994. In the words of Frei, «Lehman’s bosses, led by 
Richard Fuld, peddled billions of dollars worth of bundled sub-prime mortgages 
every month and made a mint from fees and commissions» (Frei, 2009). Awed 
by its spectacular «success» in the world of finance, the organizers of the 2008 
alb China Law Awards hailed it with such glorious titles as ‘Debt Market Deal 
of the Year’ and ‘Equity Market Deal of the Year’. Ironically the same year this 
«too-big-to-fail» institution suffered heavy losses in the share market due to the 
bursting of «the sub-prime mortgage bubble which it helped to inflate» (Frei, 
2009). After that, its impressive goodwill in the market kept on downsliding 
bearishly. When it realized that the losses it had accrued were beyond recovery, 
it filed for insolvency and sought bankruptcy protection on 15 September 2008. 
The next morning witnessed unprecedented scenes of Lehman employees 
removing files and other items with the company logo from its famous World 
Headquarters in New York. That day the Lehman shares tumbled over 90% in 
the share market. On September 17, 2008, the New York Stock Exchange de-
listed it from its exclusive list of trading companies, thus sealing the fate of this 
iconic investment bank. Preceding that, however, the Lehman had already set 
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the stage for many more such failures in the coming days resulting into severe 
damages to the world economy that it still has to recover from.
Like the Lehman, Bernard Madoff, a swindler, who was later sentenced 
to imprisonment for 150 years by the Manhattan Court, also «had earned a 
reputation as a trusted money manager with a Midas touch» during the 1990s. 
Even as the market fluctuated, the clients of his famous «Ponzi scheme» (also 
called «Pyramid Scheme») garnered steady double-digit returns for decades 
(«Madoff gets 150 years», 2009). But his Ponzi scheme worth $65 billion was 
essentially a fraud devised to lynch financially his unsuspecting investors. In 
reality he, like Margayya, never made any investments. He rather used the money 
from new investors to pay returns to the existing clients and to finance a lavish 
life-style for his family. The money-spinning frauds like Madoff who have 
seldom been out of market lie behind Margayya as his real-life prototypes. The 
novelist himself admits that Margayya is «a combination of two personalities»: 
one was «a gentleman in Mysore who encouraged people to borrow and spend, 
shattering once and for all the philosophy of thrift», and the other one was a 
fraud in the region who «promised dazzling, fantastic scales of interest and 
dividends on the money entrusted to his care, and he became the only subject 
of conversation until he crashed and landed in jail» (Narayan quoted in Prasad, 
2013: 321). The echoes of the accounts of real-life frauds in the novel betray 
how the literary text can be intertwined with numerous fibers of other texts, 
opening it up to networks of meanings.
Within the corpus of Narayan’s writings too Margayya is not an isolated 
case signifying a lethal lure for wealth. He actually vies with some of Narayan’s 
other persona from Malgudi fiction, especially Sampath from Mr. Sampath 
(1949) and Raju from The Guide (1958), in his mammoth greed, overambitious 
cunning and eventual downfall. Narayan’s moral outlook gets these Malgudians 
invariably into trouble by introducing his ethics into his narratives. His 
typically Indian theological belief that lures of money are always deceptive 
and hence dangerous comes to the fore when he makes Margayya realize: «But 
money is not everything» (Narayan, 2007: 95). The same Margayya has earlier 
averred: «Money was man’s greatest need, like air and water» (Narayan, 2007: 
22). Money actually fails to give these characters the exact happiness that 
comes only from satisfaction in life; and every traditional Indian is trained to 
dream to have this kind of satisfaction in life. Nonetheless, this realization is 
momentary in the life of Margayya, a typical Hobbesian man, who remains 
selfish, greedy and cunning throughout the novel in order to spin more and 
more money.
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The novel refers to the exploitation of the gullible rural folks, aggravated 
by the inscrutable ways of moneylenders, and the illiteracy and conservatism 
of the common people. In this context, the scene from the Bollywood movie 
Mother India (1960 ), wherein Birju the protagonist asks for the accounts book 
when the moneylender comes with his goons to take away his harvest, comes 
aptly to mind. The moneylender readily puts the book before him. But Birju and, 
for that matter, everyone in his community fails to decipher the moneylender’s 
privileged knowledge. Margayya’s doings seem as inscrutable as the former for 
his clients. The novel is deeply rooted into the contemporary social, economic, 
political and cultural reality of India, reflected through the fictional town of 
Malgudi. This socio-cultural milieu is further enriched through references to 
the dowry system, drinking, gambling, red-tapism and corruption – the banes 
of Indian society. In such a society to find money-mongers like Margayya 
is not a difficult task at all. However, looked at from the perspective of an 
unprivileged common man, the 1940s and the 2000s are not so different from 
each other in essence. The ways of private banking still remain inscrutable 
to laymen in spite of the spread of education. The people of the 1940s in the 
novel fall victim to moneylenders like Margayya only in dire circumstances, 
whereas the number of the victims of the Lehman and Madoff stands multiplied 
in present times owing primarily to the culture of consumerism. In the absence 
of any moral regulation in the postmodern world human greed for money has 
also multiplied geometrically. During the 1940s and 1950s India needed to 
balance her economy for the welfare of the poor millions. In the twenty-first 
century India and many other countries also need to reorient their state policies 
to save the poor from the onslaughts of globalized markets. In such a scenario 
Narayan’s novel becomes more contemporary and relevant, fitting into the role 
of an intertext for the discourse of private banking.
Analogical links between the fictional and actual financial frauds provide 
eye-opening illustrations of the adventurous banking practices followed by 
most of the bankers, especially when the regulating agencies are found wanting. 
These traces also throw a revealing light into the murky realities of the business 
world, which always keeps the economy vulnerable to frauds and scandals. 
The recent global financial crisis along with the fictional downfall of Margayya 
also exposes the inherent weaknesses of any capitalist financial system that 
leaves the economy at the mercy of the market forces. The market forces, 
driven blindly by the sole purpose of maximizing their profit, pave the way for 
bubbles. Institutions like the Lehman Brothers, and individuals like Margayya 
and Madoff succeed in inflating the bubble every time because they work in 
tandem to cash in on the human madness for money. They prove time and again 
 50 clr ˙ doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.6035/clr.2014.12.3 ˙ issn 1697-7750 · vol. xii \ 2014, pp. 43-57
that maximum people can be fooled for a much longer time by keeping them 
allured by promises of hot returns and not letting them have a chance to peep 
into their actual dealings.1
The factors – economic as well as human – that lie behind these kinds of 
financial frauds, whether at the individual or the institutional levels, are more 
or less the same. The most obvious economic reason to cause the recent sub-
prime mortgage crisis was the indulgence of the multinational iconic banks like 
the Lehman Brothers, Bear Stearns, Merrill Lynch, Morgan Stanley, Goldman 
Sachs, etc., into financial engineering. Prompted to perform better in the form 
of higher returns in the short term, these banks introduced a computerized 
system of financing in the form of securitization. Krugman rightly asserts in 
this regard:
Underlying the glamorous new world of finance was the process of securitization. 
Loans no longer stayed with the lender. Instead, they were sold on to others, 
who sliced, diced and pureed individual debts to synthesize new assets. Sub-
prime mortgages, credit card debts, car loans – all went into the financial 
system’s juicer. (Krugman, 2009 a)
The computerized system of securitization was too complex for the human 
mind to comprehend; but it was allowed to go on as it proved to be extremely 
rewarding for the bankers. Extremely lax government policies and an unusually 
long span of boom in the realty sector made the operations of securitization 
affordable for the time being.
Even the seasoned players of the financial world felt tempted to believe, 
like Keatsean honeybees, that «the warm days will never cease» (Keats, 1993: 
363). However, once the market conditions became less favourable, the risks 
hidden behind the system of securitization began to surface. Very soon there 
emerged the unenviable situation of systemic risk. By then it became obvious 
that the system of securitization had actually encouraged a shadow banking 
system and moral hazard. But it was too late to do anything to contain the 
damage by streamlining the system due to the elaborate interconnections among 
the national economies across the globe. These economic factors are merely the 
visible symptoms of a much serious problem whose roots lie in certain human 
and cultural factors. Such factors have augmented not only the recent global 
1. Once the famous scientist Isaac Newton also became a victim of the speculative market. He 
invested some money in the share market for hot returns. But he lost his money in the whirl of 
the South Sea Bubble. After this bitter experience, he opined: «I can calculate the motions of 
heavenly bodies, but not the madness of people» (quoted by O’Hara, 2008: 14).
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financial crisis, but also all the other similar crises in the past. They include, 
among other things, human love for speculation, poor judgment, lack of trust, 
dominance of greed over ethics, etc. Frei (2009) rightly states: «Trust broke 
down between banks, as no one knew just how much money they owed». All 
these economic and human factors combined together to create «a disconnect 
from the real world» and led the seemingly robust financial system of the 
globalized market «to the inevitable collapse» (Rao, 2009). Narayan’s novel 
explores these human and cultural factors in a systematic way, thus enriching 
its potential as an intertext.
The Financial Expert shows the phenomenon of shadow banking and 
bubble formation more explicitly when it is read as an intertext. It appears to 
be a fictional attempt to lay bare the modus operandi of the private bankers 
that push the whole economic system into crises now and then. Margayya, 
modeled after a real-life cheat,2 is the fictional representative of all the real life 
«financial engineers» and «experts» who play havoc with the whole system by 
reducing their business to the level of a gamble. Stiglitz’s observation is worth 
mentioning here: «But much of the innovation of recent years was little more 
than accounting, regulatory, and tax arbitrage; it did not lead to better resource 
allocations or improved risk management» (Stiglitz, 2008). In fact, Narayan 
also describes Margayya as a «financial engineer» and «a specialist in money» 
(Narayan, 2007: 134). No doubt, he does not have, unlike his equivalents in the 
globalized world, any computer software at his disposal to formulate foolproof 
financial equations. He nevertheless uses his own ingenious calculations as a 
usurer to exploit the infinite potential money has for him. A glimpse at his 
ingenious financial engineering might serve as an example: whenever a customer 
borrows money from him, he holds the first instalment of interest on that amount 
at the source itself. He re-lends this amount to another customer but, again, only 
after having deducted the first instalment of interest on that amount at the source 
itself. He repeats this process till he can lend the smallest amount and, thus, 
makes a profit in the form of transaction fees as well as multiple interests on the 
same amount of money. This and many other methods employed by him are, 
like those of the multinational banks, «too complex for anyone to understand» 
(Narayan, 2007: 195). Everybody is obviously «puzzled» to see his deposits 
2. Iyenger (1999: 377) refers to such another fraud in the following words: «There was, three 
decades ago, the original of Margayya whose rates of interest lured princes and professors, 
scientists and civil servants, and made fool of them all. Narayan’s art lies in giving such a 
financier an actuality of his own by setting him in a background as fantastic as his personality 
and career».
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multiply overnight. People speculate how «the wizard» does it. But no one 
has any clue to his money mystique. Guru Raj, one of his customers, calls him 
«a very great thinker», «a rare man» who has «understood all these matters» 
related to money (Narayan, 2007: 132). What else were the multinational banks 
doing in the name of banking immediately before their exposure in 2008?
Margayya, like a shadow banker, provides banking facilities even to those 
customers who are not entertained by the law-regulated Co-operative Mortgage 
Bank for their being defaulters. When the Co-operative Bank in Malgudi 
«expels» Kanda of Somanur for «default» (Narayan, 2007: 153) and refuses to 
give him a new loan, Margayya manages a loan for him by manipulating the 
provision for joint-loans. He convinces Mallanna, another customer, to become 
a party in it. He coerces him to take a loan from the bank in his own name 
and re-lend it to Kanda on a higher rate of interest. It is due to this ingenuity 
of Margayya that customers come to him instead of going directly to the Co-
operative Bank. He too loves to create these kinds of financial innovations and 
demonstrate his «wizardry» before his gasping customers. Later on, when the 
war breaks out, Margayya offers interest rates much higher than those offered 
by regular banks, and so attracts almost all the money of the region to his 
safe. In Narayan’s world, the regular banks do not connive with Margayya in 
his adventurous banking and, hence, the aftermath of his insolvency remains 
confined to his clients only. Unfortunately, this did not happen in the real world 
of 2008. Then, almost everybody was found neck-deep in the murky dealings 
of shadow banking. And hence the sub-prime mortgage crisis devastated the 
world economy like a tsunami.
Like the much-publicized global banks of today, Margayya too views 
himself as «a saviour of mankind» (Narayan, 2007: 27) for his skills to 
resolve the financial difficulties of his customers. Very much like them, 
he too thinks his job «strenuous» and feels that he deserves «the difficult 
income» (Narayan, 2007: 08) he earns in the form of fees and commissions. 
He considers his enormous wealth in the form of «gold bars in the safe at 
home and the cash bundles and the pass-book» not heaven sent but the result 
of his own «application» (Narayan, 2007: 185) and his boldness to take «risk 
on half-secured loans» (Narayan, 2007: 186). Interestingly, Krugman reports 
the case of the real-life bankers who were behind the crisis in the following 
words: «So why did some bankers suddenly begin making vast fortunes? It 
was, we were told, a reward for their creativity – for financial innovation» 
(Krugman, 2009 c). That innovation also included the unethical practice of 
advancing ninjA loans. 
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The ensuing economic crisis exposed their claims of hard labour for the 
sake of public service as a brazen lie. It became clear that their sole interest 
lied not in the service of mankind but in the fees and commissions generated 
through their financial cunning. They actually flourished by flouting the rules 
and ethics of the business of banking. Like any globalized bank, Margayya 
does not believe in advocating thrift among his customers, which was the aim 
of the Co-operative movement in India, as Margayya’s own living depends 
upon people taking more and more loans. Besides, he never bothers to know 
what happens to all the money his customers borrow. Actually, he dislikes the 
clients who are sincere in paying back their loans in time. He calls such clients 
full of «ingratitude» (Narayan, 2007: 152). Clients like Kanda of Somanur are 
his favourites for they are ready to put everything they possess in his hands. 
How he welcomes Kanda with a demand for another loan is significant: «I am 
glad you have come back to me, Kanda. I will put you out of your difficulties» 
(Narayan, 2007: 153). It again reminds the reader of the hot and glamorous 
welcome one receives at the gaudy reception counters of any multinational 
bank nowadays. That their sparkling fronts are actually façades for their ugly 
rears hardly strikes the imagination of the mesmerized customer. These banks, 
like Margayya, lend «easily» (Narayan, 2007: 181) without making any fuss 
about «legalities» (Narayan, 2007: 182). But once a customer is trapped, they 
charge fees and commissions and interests «in so many subtle ways» that the 
customer is «more or less finished» (Narayan, 2007: 183). Happily, the frugal 
people of Malgudi, unlike most of the modern-day consumer-clients, borrow 
from Margayya «only under stress» (Narayan, 2007: 182) as they know that 
once a client is gripped in his clutches, he will not hesitate even to impose 
foreclosure on him/her if s/he fails to pay back the loan. Many of them borrow 
to meet the demands of the dowry at the time of their daughters’ marriage; and 
a few borrow for gambling and drinking. Whenever Margayya finds his clients 
«crazed and unhappy» (Narayan, 2007: 183) over the orders of the courts, he 
never bothers about them. He rather dismisses them by saying: «It is all in the 
business» (Narayan, 2007: 183). He even nullifies the provisions of «debt relief 
laws and such things» first by making everything look «correct on paper», and 
then by conniving with the law-enforcing people who are usually «enthusiastic 
collaborators in his scheme» (Narayan, 2007: 183). Kanda’s case is worth 
mentioning: he used to be a well-to-do farmer with twenty acres of fertile land, 
a house and cattle; but now, he is finished as all of his property lies tied up in 
mortgages – mostly through Margayya’s advice and assistance. Same was the 
fate of the customers of the globalized banks in the usA who invested in the 
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realty sector by borrowing from banks on easy instalments, leading to the sub-
prime crisis.
Like any other money launderer, Margayya does not trust anybody, 
including Madan Lal, his partner, Shastri, his accountant, and Dr. Pal, the 
principal instrument in his mercurial rise and furious fall. His tendency to be 
suspicious of everything and everybody keeps him constantly on high alert, so 
much so that he even begins «to doubt» (Narayan, 2007: 166) the very police 
inspector who helps him locate his runaway son Balu. Guru Raj’s offering of 
an office on rent without any fuss surprises him as he is «unused to such brisk 
and straightforward transactions» (Narayan, 2007: 131). Narayan portrays in 
Margayya’s over-alertness a lack of trust and nervous anxiety many businessmen 
suffer from. Such pattern of behaviour can be observed among the real-life 
players in the financial market also. This lack of trust makes any system highly 
fragile and susceptible to breakdown at any moment. The recurring crises in 
the history of finance are a fact to take into account in this regard. Every time a 
crisis occurs and experts analyze it in retrospect, lack of trust surfaces inevitably 
as one of the main causes. Even an uncreditted rumour is enough to ruin the 
reputation of any institution or individual within moments. Margayya also falls 
prey to this feature. He enlists Dr. Pal’s services to build up public trust in his 
financial wizardry and engineering. But gradually, he finds his interests clashing 
with those of Dr. Pal. When one night he loses his temper and beats him out 
of anger, the consequences wreak havoc for him. The very next morning, Dr. 
Pal turns out to be his nemesis as he visits a few of Margayya’s clients and 
narrates the incident ambiguously suggesting: «Things are probably not going 
smoothly there» (Narayan, 2007: 214). Taking a cue from this statement, the 
irrational human behaviour finds another chance to perform its tricks. Without 
verifying the facts, people begin to flock at Margayya’s door to withdraw their 
deposits. Margayya begins to return their money. But very soon all the cash in 
the house is gone and the crowd still keeps on increasing. Ultimately, he sends 
for the police and a lawyer in order to file for insolvency. He spends the next 
three or four months «attending courts, lawyers, inventories and so on and so 
forth» (Narayan, 2007: 217). Ultimately, everything is gone. Even the house 
where his pampered son Balu is living with his family is «attached» (Narayan, 
2007: 217). This description of Margayya’s insolvency in the novel brings to 
the reader’s mind the images of the tumultuous scene outside the main office 
of the Lehman on 16 September 2008 when the officials began to vacate the 
building after the firm’s bankruptcy.
Margayya’s indulgence in speculation by attracting people with black 
money presents another impeccable parallel to the work-culture of most of the 
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multinational companies in the global world. Margayya knows that, due to the 
circumstances generated by the ongoing world war, there is an overflow of 
«unaccounted and unaccountable» money lying «hidden in bundled-up currency 
notes in dark boxes» (Narayan, 2007: 193) with merchants, contractors, drug 
stockists, military men, go-betweens and busybodies. As he sees in it a golden 
opportunity to make undreamt of profit, he, like Bernard Madoff, begins to 
offer twenty percent interest rates, much higher than the regular banks’ meager 
three percent. People, who are interested only in their returns, do not bother to 
find out how Margayya manages to pay such a high interest rates. They rush 
towards him with their easy as well as hard money. In this way, Margayya’s 
indigenous Ponzi scheme skyrockets him to «the undreamt heights of financial 
success» (Narayan, 2007: 191). He receives thousands of rupees every day. He, 
however, does not have any scheme to invest this huge money into some more 
productive business in order to sustain its productivity. He, like any speculator, 
keeps it stored up in his house and relies on his fanatical calculation: «If I get 
twenty thousand rupees deposit each day and pay fifteen in interest, I have still 
five thousand a day left in my hands as my own» (Narayan, 2007: 195). Before 
going bankrupt, he has money hoarded in his house not only in an iron safe 
but also in «the cupboards, the benches and tables, the space under the cot, 
and the corners» (Narayan, 2007: 200). Narsimhan (2008) rightly observes in 
this regard: «Forgotten in the euphoria of this financial alchemy is the basic 
tenet that financial sector has no standing of its own. It derives its strength and 
resilience from the real economy». Margayya forgets it; Madoff forgot it; the 
Lehman Brothers and the likes also forgot it. As their financial «innovation» 
failed to ensure a better resource allocation or improved risk management, they, 
despite all their wizardry, engineering and mysticism in money-matters, fell 
down the very moment most people hardly expected it. Only a few wise people 
like Raghuram Rajan of the University of Chicago acknowledged that the bubble 
was already too inflated and was waiting just for an excuse to burst. Dr. Pal in 
the case of Margayya, and the sub-prime mortgage crisis in the Lehman one, 
just pressed the metaphorical «reset button» (Dewan, 2009) to let the bubble 
deflate. 
Harold Bloom says: «A single text has only part of a meaning; it is itself 
a synecdoche for a larger whole including other texts» (Bloom, 1975: 106). In 
this context, the striking parallels discussed in the previous pages between the 
dealings of actual people and institutions like Bernard Madoff and the Lehman, 
on the one hand, and those of the fictional Margayya, on the other, open up before 
the reader a fascinating world of «intense intertextual references and allusions» 
(Allen, 2007: 201). In this intertextual world, the present and the past, the real 
 56 clr ˙ doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.6035/clr.2014.12.3 ˙ issn 1697-7750 · vol. xii \ 2014, pp. 43-57
and the fictional, the existing and the evolving, interact with each other, and the 
intertextual pathways they create invite the reader’s attention to the recurring 
phenomenon of bubble formation and its eventual burst causing pain for millions 
in their wake. At the end of the novel, the reader beholds Margayya preparing to 
begin his business afresh from under the same banyan tree before the Co-operative 
Bank as at the beginning of the novel. Iyenger (1999: 377), in describing him as 
a «Napoleon of finance», rightly discerns this scene as an instance of Narayan’s 
comic irony, that invests the persona of his protagonist with a Napoleon like 
resilience and incorrigible will to move on in spite of colossal failures. Read 
dialogically, this ending finds its real-life reverberations in the decisions taken 
by the leading national governments over the world to bail out, instead of 
punishing, the sick banks for their wrong-doings. In the words of Paul Krugman, 
the authorities seem to believe that «once investors calm down, securitization 
– and the business of finance – can resume where it left off a year or two ago» 
(Krugman, 2009 c). It actually amounts to encouraging individuals, institutions 
and regulating agencies to keep on playing not only with the investors’ money, 
but also with their trust in the system. And the common man, caught in «a crisis 
of culture» (Johnson quoted by Dewan, 2009) will remain destined to bear the 
real brunt of such crises in the future too. Arindham Chaudhury accuses common 
people also of their willy-nilly involvement in these kinds of crises. According 
to him, people driven by a culture of consumerism – a culture of use and throw – 
facilitate «the western, diehard, capitalistic, greed-driven materialism» that thrives 
by creating «artificial demand» and converting consumers into «material dustbins 
for the profits of a handful of corporations» (Chaudhury, 2009).
After having witnessed various crises during the last twenty-five years, 
William Walsh (1983: 72) should revise his suggestion that the subversion of 
«strong Victorian-British emphasis on the qualities of self-help and thrift» into 
«help yourself» is what constitutes «the Indian sensibility». The fact that Narayan 
takes up the issue of private banking and deals with it in great detail in his novel 
should not encourage anyone to confine the issue exclusively to the realm of the 
Indian ethos. The more or less similar accounts of the goings-on in the banking 
sector at a global level are enough to highlight the universal greed of usurers and 
private bankers especially when faced with the lack of uniform regulations. 
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